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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. BETLEY,
Platintiff arnd Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No.10796

LOUIS R. GALLEGOS,

Defendant a;nd Appellarnt.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, a former police officer,
against defendant to recover damages for injuries arising out of an automobile-motorcycle accident which occurred on Saturday, March 17, 1962, at about 5 :15 p.m.
on 24th Street in Ogden, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Charles
G. Cowley, Judge, sitting with a jury. The jury brought
in a Yerdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $10,000.00.
1

Defendant filed and argued a motion for a judgment not
withstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new
trial, both of which were denied hy the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court and judgment in defendant's
favor as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident on which the plaintiff premises his
cause of action occurred on Saturday, the 7th day of
March, 1962, at approximately 5 :15 p.m. on 24th Street
at a point approximately 180 feet east of the interscrtion of 24th Street and Washington Boulevard, in Ogden, Utah. The plaintiff in the action was, at the time
the accident occurred, a police officer for the Ogden City
Police. He terminated his services, however, with the
Police Department in July of 1964 (Tr. 65). l\Ir. Betley
was 22 years of age at the time of the accident and had
been with the Ogden Police Force for about a year prior
thereto.
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, resided at 815 1;>\r est
26th Street, Ogden, Utah, at the time of the accident,
and was a Mexican employed as a foreman for the Traek
Gang of the Utah General Depot and was 58 years of
age.
Twenty-fourth Street, in Ogden, Utah, was 60 feet
wide (Tr. 11). East of Washington Boulevard there
2

two westbound lanes of traffic which were divided
hy a striped white line, and two eastbound lanes of
traffic likewise divided by a striped white line, and a leftturn lane which had a solid line to the north side of it
and double yellow lines no longer clearly visible to the
south side of it, which yellow lines were about six inches
apart. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 (Tr. 44, 45, 133). The
center of the highway was in the left turn lane and
toward the north side of it (Tr. 22). The left-turn lane
extended east of the point where the accident occurred
to about the Eagle's Lodge as shown in defendant's Exhibit 4 (Tr. 44, 45). There were also places for vehicles
to park on the north and south side of 24th Street (Tr.
44). Canal Alley took off from 24th Street to the north
behind W. T. Grant Company at a point approximately
180 to 190 feet east of Washington Boulevard (Tr. 45).
Mr. Betley had traveled this area on numerous occasions
and was familiar with traffic markings in the area
(Tr. 44).

W(~re

Each of the witnesses who testified to the facts of
the accident and the condition of the traffic lines delineating the traffic lanes testified that the lanes were
very faint and that particularly the lines identifying the
double yellow line for the left-turn lane were either very
fa int or non-existent. Officer ·Wilson (Tr. 15) said that
double lines were visible but you had to look closely to
see them. You could sit in the vehicle and see them if ~rnn
were to the side of them, but they were faint, very faint.
Officer Wilson in his patrol vehicle drove from the inside
lane on the west side of Washington Boulevard into the
left turn lane on the east side of Washington Boulevar<l
3

and discovered that he was in the wrong lane and moved
to the right (Tr. 19). Traffic generally went further up
the hill than he did before turning to the right. He state<l
that it was not easy to discern the double line or any li11e
at all (Tr. 19).
Mr. Betley stated the markings on the higlm:1y
were quite faint (Tr. 44), that the lines down close to
Washington Boulevard did not show (Tr. 73), that the
lines needed painting (Tr. 150), and that the photograph (Exhibit D-1) was a fair representation of thl'
appearance of the lines on the street (Tr. 73), but he
also claimed that the lines did show in the photograph
(Exhibit D-1) (Tr. 73). Officer Wilson also identiged the
photograph D-1 and stated that it was a fair representation of the appearance of the street and lines as of the
time of the accident (Tr. 16).
Robert Morris, a professional photographer, took
the photographs (Exhibits D-1 and D-4) on the 23rd of
March, 1962, at 11 :00 a.m. which was six days after the
accident occurred. The pictures were taken in the center of the street (Tr. 108, 109). They were ta ken from a
standing position at eye level (Tr. 123). He examined
the street for lines and said there was no double line arnl
said the picture was a fair representation of the appearance of the lines that appeared on the highway. He further stated that there was no double line near "\V ashington Boulevard.
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, testified that he could
not see the yellow lines on the pavement (Tr. 157, 161),
and Danny Gallegos the son of the defendant who was
4

1

with the defendant at the time of the accident also testified that the lines generally were quite faded (Tr. 176),
that he examined the street to see if there were any double yellow lines, and there were none (Tr. 179, 181).
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, was on his ·way to
the Rainbow Gardens, a swimming pool in Ogden, Utah,
to pick up his two daughters whom he had taken there in
the forenoon over the same route (Tr. 153, 154). He was
in the inside lane for eastbound traffic and had been sineP,
entering on to 24th Street (Tr. 156, 157, 176, 182). He
stopped on the west side of Washington Boulevard for
the red semaphore signal, in the inside lane of traffic, and
when it changed, proceeded forward directly east (Tr.
156, 157). As the light turned green, the police officer
came up along his right side (Tr. 176), and proceeded
into the intersection where he shifted into second gear on
the police motorcycle he was operating.
M.r. Betley was traveling at about 20 miles per hour
when he reached the east side of the intersection at Washington Boulevard (Tr. 74). He was in the inside lane, he
imagined and probably close to the middle of the lane, but
he didn't recall for sure (Tr. 75). At some time as he
proceeded east on 24th Street he moved over toward the
lines, and at the point when he was turning or started to
make his turn, he was on the double yellow lines. When
he started across 24th Street he intended to go east about
100 feet including Washington Boulevard, make a "U"
turn and return (Tr. 126) to join Officer Hunter, another
motorcycle officer who was on duty on Washington Bou1eva rcl (Tr. 42). He did not recall whether there were
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any vehicles proceeding east to the right of him up 24th
Street east of Washington Boulevard (Tr. 125). He
claimed he was signaling for a left turn as he crossed tfo,
cross-walk on the east side of Washington Boulevard
(Tr. 45). He had no mechanical signal for a turn and
claimed that he was signaling with his arm (Tr. 46). JIP
had previously told Officer Wilson who investigated the
accident that he thought he gave a signal before shifting
but couldn't swear to it (Tr. 26). When he reached a
point approximately 100 feet east, he then observed a
truck in Canal Alley on the north side of 24th Stred
and decided that he would go up and investigate (Tr.
143). At that time he shifted down and dropped ~ii;;
arm and did not continue to give a further signal while
he was traveling from 50 to 70 feet (Tr. 143). As lie
started to make his left turn, the Gallegos vehicle would
have been parallel to him, an Mr. Betley was just to
the right of the double yellow line as he started his turn
(Tr. 46, 49, 76, 127).
Just as Mr. Betley started his turn, at the same illstant as he turned, he caught a glimpse of the Gallegos
vehicle (Tr. 140). He had not turned his head to look for
any traffic that may have been coming behind him (Tr.
141), although he admitted that this is what he usually
did, and it was a good habit to get into (Tr. 140). The
only time he looked through his rear-view mirror was
just as he started to turn, and he said he got a glimpse
of something in his rear-view mirror and his bike was
thrown (Tr. 47, 140).
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The impact occurred, according to Mr. Betley, approximately 5 to 6 inches or possibly a foot left of the
double yellow line (Tr. 130). Officer Wilson put the impoint of impact near the double line (Tr. 11). The initial
point of impact on the vehicles was the end of the left handle bar of the motorcycle and the right side of the Gallegos vehicle at a point near the antenna which was just
forward of the windshield on the right front fender (Tr.
8, 9, 23. Defendant's Exhibits 9, 6, 3 and 2). After the
impact the bicycle fell south of the double yellow line and
east of the point of impact. Officer Wilson measured 39
feet south from the north curb to the handle bar of the
motorcycle (Tr. 22 and 23). He also testified that the
crnter of 24th Street above Washington Boulevard with
respect to the traffic lanes was toward the north side of
the left-turn lane (Tr. 22). The distance from the point
of impact to the left handle bar of the motorcycle afti~r
it fell to the highway was 17 feet east and south of the
point of impact (Tr. 7). The defendant's vehicle was
mrasured 108 feet from the point of impact in an easterly
direction and slightly south from the point of impact.
Mr. Gallegos, the defendant, observed the officer
pull out ahead of him through Washington Boulevard
as he, himself, proceeded directly in an easterly direction from the lane within which he was stopped on
the west side of Washington Boulevard. He followed
the officer with the officer being just a few feet ahead of
him, and the right side of the Gallegos vehicle approximately three to four feet from the motorcycle of the
officer (Tr. 161, 162, 176, 177). He observed that the
offi<'er was in uniform, and defendant was careful to see
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that defendant did what was right ('l'r. 162). He kept
his eye on the road ahead and glanced at the officer occasionally (Tr. 163). He did not see the officer turn but
felt the impact as soon as the officer's motorcycle struck
his car (Tr. 163). His son, Danny, also said that he had
been hit by the policeman (Tr. 167). Defendant looked to
the rear and saw the policeman down on the highway and
tried to stop but was confused and didn't know what to
do after the impact but did bring his vehicle to a stop
some distance east of the motorcycle and then hacked np
a little bit (Tr. 164). He estimated his speed at 15 to 20
miles per hour (Tr. 164). Officer Betley estimated Mr.
Gallegos' speed at 15 to 25 miles per hour and stated that
he was not traveling too fast (Tr. 139).
Danny Gallegos who was riding in the right fr.:mt
seat testified that his father's speed was about 20 mill'S
per hour (Tr. 180). He also stated that the officer ·wa:-;
about 3 feet ahead and 3 or 4 feet to the right of the right
side of his father's vehicle (Tr. 180). He watched thP
officer from the time he saw him pull through "\Vashi11gton Boulevard until the time the impact occm-red aml
testified that the officer did not at any time give a signal
for a left turn (Tr. 177, 187). When the officer started
to make his left turn, he tried to warn his father, hnt
was unable to warn him before the impact occnrn•cl
(Tr. 183).
The plaintiff was not knocked from the hike by the
impact with the car but did fall to the ground ,,·ith th<'
left-hand side of the bike being on the ground ('rr. :>O).
He was still straddling the bike, an<l it waR on top ot'
8

his left leg. The plaintiff crawled out from underneath
the bike and tried to stand up, but he was unable to do so,
and some officers from the Ogden City Police Department
who appeared at the accident shortly after it occurred
took him to the Dee Hospital where he remained for
about four hours (Tr. 55, 56). He ·was experiencing pain
in his left knee which had been operated on hef ore while
he was a student in Montana. (Tr. 56). He returned to
work after a week and drove an automobile for a while.
When he went back to work, he had to keep his knee
wrapped with Ace bandages, and it caused him some
pain or discomfort when he walked (Tr. 57). After he
went back to work, the swelling went down, and the knee
felt fairly good after that, but it was some time before he
took the Ace bandages off because it felt weak (Tr. 58).
He also took about six or seven physical therapy treatments from Dr. Krambule in Ogden over about that mauy
weeks (Tr. 61, 62). In May of 1962 while riding his
motorcycle in a training course for others he had an accident in which he injured his shoulder which had to br
operated ou (Tr. 105). Both of l\Ir. Betley's knees had
been operated on while he was a student in high school
for removal of the cartilage in each one (Tr. 30-31).
In February, 1964, Dr. Louis Peery, an orthopedist,
in Ogden, Utah, performed an explorator>· operation on
the knee but determined that there ·were no correcti,·e
procedures required at that time ancl did not do aI\\eorrective surgery. Dr. Peery testified that the injm~·
would not be limiting to l\Ir. Betle>- in the future as far
as sports such as howling and golf are concerned, but
that he would he better off if he didn't participate too

much in active running sports (Tr. 90). He also ill(licated that he might have some difficulty in the futur(•
with the knee.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT.
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN FAILING UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES TO GIVE A SIGNAL
FOR A LEFT TURN OR TO LOOK TO THE
REAR FOR TRAFFIC, AND THE COURT,
THEREFORE, ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE.
Counsel recognizes that ordinarily the qnestion of
negligence, contributory negligence and proximate causr
are proper questions for the jury to decide and that m1less it appears as a mathematical certainty that the accident in question would not have occurred had it not hecn
for certain acts of negligence, such negligence would not
as a matter of law be a proximate cause of the accident.
The defendant strongly believes that the facts in this
case showed clearly and conclusively that the plaintiff
was negligent and that his negligence was, as a mattrr of
law, a proximate cause of the collision, that the defendant was not negligent a.nd, therefore, the <lefendant was
entitled to a directed verdict.
Five witnesses, including- the plaintiff, testifie(l ns
to the condition of the traffic lines on 24th Street. All
10

of them testified that the lines were faint and that paricularly the double yellow lines were faint or non-existent. In addition thereto defendant's Exhibit 1 which ii"
a photograph taken of the highway where the accident
occurred six days after the accident occurred clearly
shows that the double yellow line was not in existence
nt the time this accident occurred, and it could not,
therefore, be controlling on traffic at the time this accident occurred. Both the plaintiff and Capt. Wilson, of
the Sheriff's Force in Weber County, who was the inYestigating officer, testified that Exhibit D-1 was a fair
representation of the appearance of the highway and the
appearance of the lines as they existed at the time the
accident occurred. The record reflects the following with
respect to these various witnesses:
Officer Wilson (Tr. 14)
Q. What was the condition of the marking of the
roadway at that time?
A. This one lane was quite definite. This one line
here (indicating on blackboard). The double
line had faded.

(Tr. 15)
Q. Now actually, Capt. Wilson, were those lines
visible at the time.
A. Which ones?
Q. Down in the lower area here, this double line.
(Indicating on blackboard).
A. They were visible, but you had to look closely
to see them.
Q. Well, when you say you have to look closely,
how close did you have to be to the lines to
see them?
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A. Well, you could sit in a vehicle and look and
see them if you was to the side of them or
you could stand and look down and see them,
but they were faint, very faint.
Q. I show you what has been marked for identification as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and ask you
to state whether or not you have seen that
photograph before.
A. Yes, sir, I have.
Q. Will you state what it is.
A. This is the picture of the scene where the accident took place.

Q. Could you state whether or not the photograph
appears to be a fair representation of the appearance of the street and the lines as of the
time the accident occurred~
A. Yes, it is.
Officer Wilson was asked to identify the double yellow lines on the photograph and he stated as follows:
(Tr. 17, 18) ''The double yellow lines would be right
here. On the picture you can see the traces of it going
down here" (indicating on photograph). It is interesting to note that Officer Wilson after the aecident had
occurred approached the place of the accident from : itP
west side of Washington Boulevard in the inside lane
and proceeded across and found that he was in the let'tturn traffic lane for westbound traffic. He testified that
he was on the west side of the highway and he pointed 1..
the inside lane and then was asked the following:
(Tr. 19)
Q. All right, now which way did you proceed 1
A. I went straight east on 24th.
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Q. In which lane did you go in?
A. As I went across, I found myself right here
in this lane [pointing to the left lane of traffic
for westbound traffic] (ours in brackets) but
knowing, I knew that this was wrong, and I
immediately moved over to the right.
Q. Now, did you you observe the traffic generally
there?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And how did they proceed?
A. Usually they went farther up the hill before
they moved to the right.
Q. Down at the point where they crossed was it
easy to discern the double line or any line at
all?
A. No, it wasn't easy.

The plaintiff, Officer Betley, traveled this highway
frequently in performing his duties for the Ogden City
Police Department. He testified as follows with respect
to the markings on the highway:
(Tr. 44)
Q. Now, I will ask you if you will describe, as
you recall, the condition of the markings on
the highway.
A. They were quite faint.

(Tr. 73)
Q. (Referring to Defendant's Exhibit 1.) All
right, now would you say that's a fair representation of the appearance of the lines at
the time the accident occurred, the traffic lines?
A. Y cs. The only thing in this one photograph
here, if I may, the lines that you see here
where the water is here, you can't see them,
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but this is where the accident took place, and
you can see the lines here if you look closely.
Q. Down below close to W a.shington Boulevard
the lines did not show, did they?
A. Right. No, they don't.
Q. But when you got up further, then the lines
did show as shown in this photograph but
were still very faint, is that correct 1
A. Yes, right here. But you can't tell here because of the water on the street.

Robert Morris, a professional photographer, residing in Ogden, Utah, at the time the accident occurred
took photographs (Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 4) of
24th Street where the accident occurred six Jays after
the accident had occurred. He testified that he took
them from the center of the street, and he testified that
he took them for the purpose of showing the lines up and
down the center of the street. His testimony is as
follows:
(Tr. 109)
Q. And did you examine the street itself for the
lines?
A. Yes.
Q. Now could you state whether or not those
pictures are a fair representation of the appearance of the lines as of the time you took
the pictures 1
A. Yes.
Q. And in your examination of the lines of the
street did you observe whether or not there
was any double line that showed near thr
center of the street.
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A. I don't believe there was anv double line that
showed in the center.
·
Q. Did you see any?

A. No.

And again on cross-examination:
(Tr. 111)
A. I can remember at the time of taking the
pictures at the location of the pictures that
there was no double lines.
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, testified that he could
not see any lines as he proceeded up the street.
(Tr. 161)
Q. And you did look for the lines then, is that
true?
A. I did.
Q. And you couldn't see them?
A. I couldn't see them, no.

Danny Gallegos, the son of the defendant, also testified
that the lines were faded, that he examined the street ro
see if there were any double yellow lines, and there were
none. (Tr. 179)
Q. (line 27) Did you examine the street to see
if there were any double yellow lines?
A. Yes, but there was no double line.
(Tr. 181)
Q. And when he, [speaking of Louis Gallegos],
crossed the street, which lane did he enter in?
Do you have an opinion as to that? When he
got across the street, which lane was he in?
A. I couldn't say for sure because I couldn't see
the lines. He would have been anywhere within the turning lane or in his own lane.

15

It is clear from the evidence of each of the witnesses
who testified concerning the lines that the double yellm,line was not readily visible to an ordinarily observant
person. Not one witness testified that it was readily ohservable. Section 41-6-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Subsection b provides as follows:

to - Effect of Improper Position,
Illegibility or Absence of Sign.

OBEDIENCE

(b) No provision of this Act for which signs are
required shall be enforced against an alleged
violator if at the time and place of the alleged
violation an official sign is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an
ordinarily observant person.
Section 41-6-63, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the placrment of marks on the highway where the volume of traffir
or the vertical or horizontal curvature of the roadway
renders it hazardous to drive along the highway on thP
left of such marking or markings, and provides that:
When such marking or markings are in place,
the driver of a vehicle shall not drive along tlw
highway to the left thereof. Under subsection
l(a) the following markings shall he eonsiderPtl
distinctive roadway markings:
(a) A double longitudinal line, painted yellow, each line 4 inches wide and space(l
4 inches apart.
The court erroneously submitted this question to th 0
jury when, in fact, all the evidence was that it was not
legible enough to be seen by an ordinarily observant person. Not one witness testified they were readily ohscn16

able. This constituted error on the part of the court and
misled the jury into its finding of negligence on the part
of the defendant.
The impact, according to those who testified pertaining thereto, to-wit: Officer Wilson, who said it was
on or near the yellow line and the plaintiff, Officer Betley,
who said it was 6 inches or a foot to the north of the
double yellow lines, would indicate that the defendant's
,-ehicle at the time of the accident was on the south side
of the center of the highway. Officer "'Wilson said that
the eenter of the highway which he described as 60 feet
wi(lc was toward the north side of the left-turn lane for
westbound traffic. In Exhibit D-1 one can see by looking
down at the traffic on the west side of Washington Boulevard the center of the highway and the general flow of
traffic on the street. The west side of Viashington Boulevard and the east side of Washington Boulevard were
both 60 feet wicle. The defendant's automobile was
a hont 6 feet wide and almost all, if not all, of his vehicle
was south of the center line of the road at the time 0f
the impact.

Tt is undisputed that the defendant proceeded directly rast from the point where he stopped on the west
side of vVashington Boulevard which both he and his son
say was in the inside lane of traffic. He followed tbe
officer at a distance of a few feet with the motorcyclC'
also being three or four feet to the right of the right
si(lc of the defendant's vehicle. Both vehicles were travPling at a speed of about 15 to 20 miles per hour, tmd
tlic> plaintiff readily admitted that the defendant was not
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traveling too fast at the time the accicle11t occnrrNl nwl
further that at the time the impact occurred the dcfell<lant's vehicle was parallel with him and a few fe<>t to his
left. The point of impact on the two v<>hirles was the l'lhl
of the left handle bar on the plaintiff's motorcycle mul
the right side of the defendant's vehicle at or near tlte
antenna which was on the right front fender uear till'
windshield. Defendant's Exhibits D-2, ~ and 6 show 1h1•
mark made by the handle bar covering on the side of thr
car at the time the impact occurrerl. An examination of
Defendant's Exhibit 5 in which the motorcycle is shown
clearly shows the white handle har eo,·ering which "·as
used on the motorcyele.
Officer Betley testified that as he approaehed \Vashington Boulevard from the west, tlw light turned grer11
for him just about the time he arrived at the intersrrtion and he, therefore, did not stop but proceeded in1 o
the intersection and shifted into second gear. He wn,.;
traveling at a speed of approximately 20 miles per h(Jm
as he arrived on the east side of Washington Boulevard.
He further testified that he gave a signal with his left
hand for a turn at that point because he intended to proceed about 100 feet up 24th Street counting the width of
Washington Boulevard and then make a U-tnrn and comr
down and join Officer Hunter who was then stopped on
Washington Boulevard. (Officer Hunter took the pietnres
Plaintiff's Exhibits B & C and Defendant's 5, 6 & 9.) Betley did not remember any other vehicles being stopped wc>st
of Washington Boulevard nor did he rememher any traffic proceeding in the right-hand lane either with him or
ahead of him in the right-hand lane as he proceedc>d
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across Washington Boulevard and up 24th Street. He
testified that he was in the inside lane and probably about
in the middle thereof, although he did not recall. He was
giYing a signal, he claimed, with his left hand because
his machine did not have electrical signal equipment on
it for turns. Officer Wilson, the investigating officer,
testified that when he talked to Mr. Betley after the accident, Betley told him that he thought he gave a sign.al
before shifting but couldn't swear to it.
When he reached a point approximately 100 feet
rast, he then observed a truck in Canal Alley on the
north side of 24th Street and decided that he would go up
and investigate. At that time he shifted down, dropped
his arm and did not continue to give a further signal
while he was traveling the 50 to 70 feet to where he
started his turn. As he testified:
(Tr. 143)
Q. And when you got 100 feet up, was it then that
you decided to go up and check on the truck T
A. Yes, I just proceeded up the street then. I
didn't start to turn or anything else. I was
signaling for a turn and then just proceeded
whatever the distance was further up the
street, probably 60 or 70 feet.
Q. I see. Now then when you decided to go further ahead, did you then discontinue your signaling?
A. l don't recall, but there was probably about
three seconds there that I traveled 50 or 60
or 70 feet that I might have dropped my arm
to shift down to make the turn.
Q. I see. So you may not have been giving the
signal during that period.
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A. Well, prior to the period I was giving the signal, butQ. Just answer my questions, Mr. Betley, and
we '11 get through a lot faster. During that period I say you probably were not giving the
signal.
A. Not when I was shifting down. No, I couldn't
be.
Q. And you were shifting down during that about
70 or 80 feet or whatever it was. Is that correct?
A. From 50, 60 or 70 feet, yes.

Mr. Betley, therefore, failed completely to compl~
with the law with respect to a signal for a left turn. Utah
Statute Section 41-6-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
(a) "No person shall turn a vehicle ... to enter
a private road or driveway or otherwise turn avehicle from a direct course or move right or left
upon a roadway unless and until surh mm·ement
can be made with reasonable safety. No pers'111
shaJl turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hrreinafter provided
in the event any other traffir may be affected hy
such movement.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left
shall he given continuously during not 10ss than
the last ioo feet travelerl hy the vehrle hefore
turning.
The evid0nre is clear hy the plaintiff's 0"\'11 testimony
that he did not give a signal during the last GO to 70 frrt
prior to his making a turn and if Daniel Gallrgos, wl10
was watching him like a ha-..Yk ·watches a mouse hecnnse
he was an officer and becausr he aml 11is fatli0r "·0r1•
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traveling just to the left of Betley and a few feet behind
him, is believed, he didn't give a signal at any time after
leaving Washington Boulevard. If he had been giving
a signal for a distance of 100 feet east of Washington
Boulevard, and then discontinued giving the signal and
proceeded forward, a person following along behind him
would have a right to assume that he had given up his
intention of making a turn and that he thereafter intended to proceed straight forward. His failure to give
a signal during the last 100 feet as provided by statute
was a violation of the statute, negligence and a proximate
<'ause of the accident.
He certainly didn't know whether or not there was
any traffic which would be affected by his failure to
give a signal because he did not at any time look to see
whether or not there was any traffic behind him or to
the left of him. This in spite of the fact that he was well
acquainted with the condition of the highway where the
accident took place and the absence of the lines delineating the left-turn lane. ·w"ith respect to lookout he
testified as follows:
(Tr. 140)
Q. Now you didn't observe the vehicle back at
Washington Boulevard, did you~
A. No, I didn't.
Q. And as you approached the place where the
accident occurred, did you look to the rear to
see if any cars were coming?
A. Not turning my head. No.

Q. ·well, did you look through your rear-view
mirror.

21

A. I did catch a glimpse of a vehicle coming
through my rear-view mirror.
Q. Well, that was after vou started vour turn
though, wasn't it?
·
·
'
A. Yes. Yes, it was right at the same instant as
my turn.
(Tr. 141)
Q. Does your motorcycle have a rear-view mirror
on it, did I understand you to say?
A. It had two of them, right.
Q. And is this prior to turning - what you did
is look in your rear-view mirror?
A. Well, I don't know whether I looked or just
caught the glance of something behind me.
Now, usually you naturall)' look as yon <'omr
up the street to make sure that there's nothing
behind )'Ou.
Q. And isn't that what you usually do?
A. Yes. It is a good habit to get into, yes.
Q. And you didn't do it on this occasion; did you!
A. No, I didn't. Not that I can recall.
Q. Well, that's the first time that you ever saw
the vehicle; isn't it, as you started your turn?
A. Saw a vehicle, or the vehicle?
Q. Saw the vehicle, the Gallegos vehicle.
A. Yes.

It is clear from the plaintiff's own testimony that
he did not look either by glancing through his rear-view
mirror in time for him to do any good if he did look into
it, and he did not turn his head and look. He is charged
with the knowledge which he had at the time that thl'
lines were definitely faint and not visible in most place~.
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He had been over the area many times before, and he,
therefore, had a clear duty to look. By his own testimony he failed to give a signal during the last 50 to 70
feet, and he also failed to look to see whether a car was
coming. The defendant's vehicle was right alongside
him at the time he turned. The only impact was between
the handle bar and the right side of the defendant's
vehicle. There was no speed on the part of the defendant's vehicle, and if the plaintiff had looked at all,
he would have seen that the car was there, and he could
either have slowed more than he did until the car went
by or accelerated so that he could make his turn when
he would not be hindered by the vehicle of the defendant.
In the case of Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Ut. 2d 171, 263
P.2d 796, our court said:
·we have held that the Statute requires a
driver who is about to make a left turn to give
way to oncoming traffic, and one executing such
a turn is C'hargeable with negligence upon failure
properly to judge speed or distance. The driver
here was in his proper lane, but was charged not
with failure to heed oncoming traffic, but in failing to observe traffic behind. Aside from statute,
whether one is negligent in failing to observe
traffic approaC'hing from the rear, after giving
a proper signal in the proper lane of traffiC',
would be a jury question based on the particular
facts of eaC'h C'ase, unless reasonable minds could
not di ff er as to the fact of negligence or nonnegligence - whence a matter of law would arise.
One certainly would be negligent in law if,
without reason, he deliberately turned into the
path of a speeding fire engine knowing it was
attempting to pass, but hardly could he be charged
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with negligence in turning at an intersection
without looking back or even signaling if he \\'er0
in the middle of a funeral procession with no
warning of impending danger from the rear. Between the two extremes where negligence or nonnegligence is determinable as a matter of law is a
wide territory ordinarily surveyed by the jury.
The defendant was not purposely trying to pass
the plaintiff. He was just following along to the left of
the plaintiff keeping his eyes ahead of him on the road
and occasionally glancing at the plaintiff. At the tim0
the impact occurred the defendant's gaze was naturally
some distance ahead because at that time the two vehicles were parallel with each other and about even. There
was no evidence of any negligence on defondant 's part.
In the case of Harper, et al., Appellants, v. Man_qPI,
Appellee, Florida Dist. Ct. of Appeal, March 26, 1963,
28 Automobile Cases 2d 780, 15 So. (2) 346 the defendant
was driving her automobile at 20 to 26 miles per hour
on a clear, dry day and attempting to pass the plaintiff
on the left. When approximately ten yards from the
bicycle of the plaintiff, the plaintiff suddenly and without warning cut directly into the defendant's path. T110
defendant in that action took the only instinctivel~·
evasive action by cutting her steering wheel to the left
and applying her brakes. The court held that there
were no facts upon which any negligence of the defendant
could be predicated. The plaintiff was, as a matter of
law, guilty of negligence proximately causing the accident, and the decision of the trial court in granting <1
summary judgment was upheld. In this case tlw plai1124

tiff cyclist was riding about one to one and one-half yards
uorth of the south curb prior to the time the accident
occurred. His deposition showed that prior to the time
the accident occurred and prior to the time that he
turned his bicycle to the left, he was aware of vehicular
traffic behind him going in the same direction that he
was going. He stated, however, that just before he turned
to his left he did not know where this vehicular traffic
was. The plaintiff further stated that he never saw the
defendant's automobile until he heard the squeal of her
tires, although he stated that just before he began his
left turn he turned his body and looked behind him for
traffic.
The re,-iewing court stated:

It appears from this record on appeal that
the final summary judgment rendered by the trial
court was correct in all particulars, and in particular that portion wherein he found that the
sole proximate cause of the accident was the
plaintiff's own negligence; that the defendant
was not guilty of any negligence and was not
possessed of any opportunity to reasonably prevent the accident after the plaintiff himself had
commenced a course of conduct which resulted in
the injury.
Mr. Betley contended in his testimony that he had
no duty to look to the rear, that he could assume that
there wouldn't be a car passing him on the left in the
left-turn lane for westbound traffic. Of course, the lefttnrn lane was not readily observable at the time this
accident occurred. The courts have held, in any event,
that one is not absolved of this duty of maintaining a
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proper lookout and g1vmg a signal at a place on the
highway where a vehicle could not overtake and pass
without violating the law. Thus in the case of Bellon,
Apellant v. Heinzig, et al., Respondent, United States
Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., June 4, 1965, District
Court of Mont., 347 F. (2d) 4, 33 Automobile Cases 2<l,
1335, the trial judge found both parties guilty of negligence. The defendants' negligence consisted of attempting to pass plaintiff's truck in a clearly marked "no
passing zone" and plaintiff was negligent in failing to
look to the rear to determine whether he could safely
make a turn. Heinzig attempted to pass in an area where
there was a clearly marked solid yellow line.
The plaintiff contended that he had a duty to maintain a lookout to the front and sincee he had a right to
assume that the defendant would abide by Section 32-2157
of the Montana Code which prohibited passing in a no
passing zone, the court erred in holding that the plaintiff
was negligent in not looking to the rear before tnrnin~
left. Section 32-2167 of the Revised Codes of Montana,
1947, provided:
No person shall turn a vehicle to enter a
private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a
vehicle from a direct course or move right or left
upon a roadway unless and until such movement
can be made with reasonable safety...
The District Court of Montana interpreted this Section
which is the same as our 41-6-69, U.C.A., 1953, as imposing an affirmative duty upon the plaintiff to maintain a proper lookout to the rear as well as forwar<l
before making a left turn. The court stated:
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Other courts have construed similar statutes
in the same way. (Citing) Werner Transportation
v. Zimmennan, 201 Fed. 2d 687, 692 [7th Cir.,
1953]. Woodmen v. Knight, 380 P.2d 222, (Idaho,
1963); Voyt v. Nyberg, 345 P.2d 821, 825 (Ore.,
1959): Scott v. Gilbertson, 85 N. W. 2d 852, 855,
(Wis., 1957); Alex v . .Jozelich, 78 N. W. 2d 440,
445, (Minn., 1956) ( 1). This is the general eommon law rule, Krause v. United States, 137 Fed.
Supp. 47, 49-50 (D. Delaware, 1955); Myers v.
Siercy, 356 S. W. 2d 59, 62-63 (Miss., 1962) (2).
Bellon was not absolved from his duty to
maintain a proper lookout to the rear by the fact
that he was making a left turn at a place on the
highway 'vhere no vehicle could overtake and pass
him without violating the law. The Supreme
Court of Montana has recognized the general rule
that a driver is entitled to assume that other
drivers will proceed in a lawful manner. (Cowden
v. Crippen, 53 P.2d 98, 104 (Mont., 1936), but it
has also noted that the rule is subject to the
qualification that one is never excused from exercising ordinary care and may not assume that
another will obey the law when in the exercise of
ordinary care it would be apparent that the other
would not. Jessen v. O'Daniel, 349 P.2d 107, 113
(Mont., 1960).
The court further stated that the section of the Code
32-2167 (our Section 41-6-69) which imposes the duty
upon the turning driver to determine that the turn can
be safely made makes no exception for the case of the
lawless passer.
Mr. Betley contended that he had a right to assume
that vehicles would not be coming up the left-turn lane
for westbound traffic, and he, therefore, had no duty to
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signal or keep a lookout. The court's instruction which
was taken from J.I.F.U. No. 1 6.12 provided that:
A person who is observing due care for his
own safety has a right to assume that another
is possessed of normal faculties of sight and hearing and that said person will use them in exercising ordinary care for his own safety and the
safety of others, and he has the right to rely on
that assumption unless, in the exercise of due
care, he observes or should observe something
to warn him to the contrary.
Mr. Betley, however, was not observing due care for
his own safety under the instructions of the court hl•cause he had not given a signal as required by law, and
he had not kept any lookout whatever to the rear aR
required by the court's instruction. This instruction,
therefore, does not help him, and he had no right to make
any assumptions.
He was negligent as a matter of law in failing to
comply with the two instructions delineating his duties
to the jury. The question then becomes whether or not as
a matter of law his failure in either one of these grounds
of negligence was a proximate cause of the accident as
a matter of law.
If on all the evidence reasonable men could come
to but one conclusion, there is no question of fact for
decision and under such circumstances the question of
proximate cause will be one of law.
Ark.: Duckworth v. Stephens, 30 S.\:V. (2) 840.
Ky.: Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W. (2) 945.
N. J.: Saracco v. Lyttle, 78 A. (2) 288.
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Ut.: Balle v. Smith, 17 P. (2) 224, 81 Ut. 179.
The undisputed evidence is that the vehicle of the
defendant was traveling at a reasonable speed parallel
to the motorcycle of the plaintiff and in immediate
proximity thereto. If he had looked whatever, he would
have seen the vehicle and not have turned. The fact that
he struck the vehicle in the side with his handle bar is
clear proof that his negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident. If he had not turned, there would not
have been an accident. If he had looked, he would not
have turned. His failure, therefore, in regard to looking
was a proximate cause of the accident.
With respect to his failure to give a signal, Danny
Gallegos was watching him at all times, and if he had
been giving a signal just prior to his turn, Danny could
have and would have warned his father. Danny did try
to warn his father when the turn was made but didn't
have time before the impact. The failure to give a signal,
therefore, was also a proximate cause of the accident
although this may not appear quite as clearly as the
failure to keep a proper lookout. Counsel submits with
respect to Point 1 that the trial court was in error in failing to grant defendant's request for a directed verdict, also
its request for a judgment not withstanding the verdict.
POINT II
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY, FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AND
SHOULD HA VE GRANTED DEFENDANT A
NR\V TRIAL.
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The defendant requested the court to give its requested Instruction No. 6 (R-12) which provided as follows:
The law requires that 110 person shall turn a
vehicle upon a public highway unless and until
such movement can be made with reasonable
safety. This does not mean, however, that the
driver of a motor vehicle before making a turn
must know that there is no possibility of accident.
It means that before starting to turn a vehicle
and while making the turn, the driver of the
vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy
a reasonably prudent person acting under similar
circumstances, that the turn could be made safely.
This request was made in accordance with Instruction
21.20 of J.I.F.U. and the provisions of 41-6-69, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. This instruction was proper under the
facts in evidence in this case. It was not completely covered by any other instruction given by the court nor by
all of the instructions given by the court. In the case of
Glover v. Jolvn G. Lane Lines, Inc., (Florida, 1963), 28
Automobile Cases 2d at page 78, the car in which plaintiff was a passenger attempted to pass defendant's truck
200 feet from an intersection. Defendant pulled out,
causing an accident injuring plaintiff. The court gaw
defendant's request for an instruction concerning a lmr
which prohibited passing within 100 feet of an intersection but refused to grant plaintiff's request for an
instruction which provided that:
No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct
course upon a highway unless and until such
movement can he made with reasonable safety,
and then only after giving an appropriate signal
in the manner hereinafter prov1d0d, in the event
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any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.
The Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial
court not to give this requested instruction under the
facts.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 was a somewhat similar instruction which the court also refused to
give which provided that the parties had a duty to drive
as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and
not to move from one lane to another until the driver
had first ascertained that he could do so with reasonable
safety. This instruction was also applicable under the
circumstances and one or the other of the two instructions should have been given, if not both. The court's
failure to give these two instructions was prejudicial to
the defendant. The duties under these instructions are
both provided by the Utah Code. Defendant took exception to the court's failure to give these instructions
('rr. 191), and the court's failure to give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 11 which requested the court
to instruct the jury as a matter of law that the double
yellow line previously existing on 24th Street was so
illegible that it could not readily have been seen by an
ordinarily observant person, and that it was, therefore,
ineffective and could not be enforced against the operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident.
The evidence concerning the matter covered under
the defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 has been
discussed in this brief under Point I and was such that
reasonable men could not differ on the conclusion that
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the double yellow line was not present or readily observable and the court should, therefore, have ruled on
this as a matter of law and given our requested Instru<'tion No. 11.
The defendant also took exception to the court's
Instruction No. 10 in which the court instructed the jury
that the defendant was driving in the wrong lane at the
time and place in question. The evidence introduced in
the case clearly showed that the defendant actually was
traveling on the south side of the center of the highway
when the accident occurred and without the double lines
being present the lane would he merely another lane
which would be available for traveling or passing.
Section 41-6-63, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the placement of marks on the highway where the volume of traffic or the vertical or horizontal curvature of the roadway renders it hazardous to drive along the highway 011
the left of such marking or markings, and provides that
when such marking or markings are in place, the driver
of a vehicle shall not drive along the highway to the left
thereof. Under subsection la the following markings
shall be considered distinctive roadway markings:
(a) A double longitudinal line, painted yellow,
each line four inches wide, and spaced four inches
apart.
Such lines were not present at the time this accident
occurred east of Washington Boulevard on 24th Stn'et.
If the plaintiff had a right to drive to the left of thr
place where the lines formerly were, so di cl the def ernhrnt.
Courts have held that the yellow lines are desig-md

32

primarily to prevent collision between an overtaking
and passing automobile and a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction and to protect occupants of other cars,
pedestrians and property on the highway, and not to
prohibit passing otherwise cars proceeding in the same
diredion. See Powell v. Clark, 255 No. Car. 707, 710,
122 S.E. 2d 706, Rushin.g v. Polk, No. Car. (Nov., 1962),
27 Automobile Cases 2d 885.
The court did not give either counsel a chance to
discuss the instructions with the court prior to the
court's instructing the jury, nor did the court inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to
instructing the jury. Counsel were furnished a copy of
instructions just at the time the court read the instructions to the jurors. After the jury retired the conr asked
counsel at that time if they wanted to take exception to
the court's instructions which was done (Tr. 190). Counsel, therefore, did not have an opportunity to determine
which instructions the court had given or refused except
as the court read the instructions to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that any negligence on the part of the
defendant Gallegos proximately caused the accident.
Furthermore, the evidence conclusively and as a matter
of law showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On either or both of these grounds the
court should have granted defendant's motion for a
directed verdict or subsequently a judgment not with-

standing the verdict and in the alternative defendant's
subsequent motion for a new trial.
The court's instructions were likewise in error, and
it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant or in the alternative
that a new trial be granted.
Respeetfully submitted,
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